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In Desert Palace v. Costa, the United States Supreme Court 
resolved much of the confusion that arose following its decision in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which concerned the appropriate 
evidentiary standard to apply in mixed-motive employment 
discrimination cases.  This Note suggests that Alaska’s mixed-
motive case law has diverged from the federal case law and has 
not yet established an internally consistent evidentiary 
requirement.  This Note also suggests that by recognizing the 
Desert Palace decision, the Alaska Supreme Court may 
simultaneously realign itself with federal law and resolve the 
ambiguity within its own case law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to combat racism by 
prohibiting discrimination in a number of contexts including voting 
(Title I),1 public accommodation (Title II),2 public schools (Title 
III),3 and federally funded programs (Title IV).4  Title VII of the 
Act was designed to ensure equal opportunity in the context of 
private employment.5  Since its enactment, Title VII has served as a 
model for civil rights legislation in many states,6 including the 
Alaska Human Rights Act (AHRA).7  One issue surrounding Title 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (2000). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
 6. See, e.g., Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000) 
(“The [Florida Civil Rights Act’s] stated purpose and statutory construction 
directive are modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”); Irvin v. 
Aubrey,  92 S.W.3d 87, 90 n.3 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he Kentucky Civil Rights 
Act mirrors Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, federal standards are used in 
evaluating discrimination claims under the Kentucky act.”); Campbell v. Garden 
City Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 97 P.3d 546, 549 (Mont. 2004) (“Reference to 
federal case law is appropriate in employment discrimination cases filed under the 
Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA), Title 49, MCA, because the provisions of 
Title 49 parallel the provisions of Title VII.”); Winters v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 132 
S.W.3d 568, 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (“The [Texas Commission on Human Rights 
Act (TCHRA)] is modeled on the federal Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Title VII); 
therefore, Texas courts follow federal statutes and cases in applying the 
TCHRA.”). 
 7. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2006).  See Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 
P.3d 40, 43 (Alaska 2000) (“The Alaska Human Rights Act . . . mirrors Title VII 
of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.”). 
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VII, the AHRA, and other state employment discrimination 
statutes is the issue of mixed-motives for firing employees.  Federal 
and state courts alike have struggled to deal with cases in which an 
employer bases an employment decision on a mixture of 
discriminatory and legitimate factors.  Historically, one particular 
point of contention has been the type of evidence a plaintiff must 
produce in order to make use of the so-called “mixed-motive” 
framework. 
While the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
evidentiary issue in mixed-motive cases head-on in Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa,8 Alaska courts have not followed suit.  The Alaska 
Supreme Court has spent the past decade flip-flopping over what 
evidentiary standard is required, all the while purporting to adhere 
to a consistent standard mirroring federal case law.  In fact, nothing 
could be further from the truth.  With each mixed-motive case 
Alaska courts have decided, they have moved further from the 
federal standard and from internal consistency.  In recent years, the 
Alaska Supreme Court has relied on the direct evidence 
requirement, despite its own precedent to the contrary and Desert 
Palace, which abandoned such a requirement.  Because the Alaska 
Supreme Court claims to use Title VII to interpret the AHRA,9 it 
is even more perplexing that the court has failed to recognize the 
change heralded by Desert Palace on not one, but three separate 
occasions. 
Part II of this Note describes the federal framework, outlining 
how the evidentiary standard for mixed-motive cases has changed 
over time.  Part III summarizes and analyzes the relevant Alaska 
case law on mixed-motive discrimination.  It claims that Alaska 
case law, although internally inconsistent, holds plaintiffs to a 
higher evidentiary standard than does the federal case law.  Part IV 
demonstrates how Alaska case law has diverged from federal case 
law and suggests that Alaska courts should abandon their reliance 
on direct evidence and follow the federal precedent. 
II.  THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK 
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to rely on certain 
illegitimate factors when making employment decisions,10 but the 
 
 8. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 9. See Era Aviation, 17 P.3d at 43. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to fail to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
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language is less clear as to what degree of reliance amounts to an 
unlawful employment practice.11  Two different lines of cases have 
emerged.  In pretext cases, an illegitimate factor is the reason for 
the employment decision.12  In mixed-motive cases, an illegitimate 
factor is only a reason, accompanied by other legitimate reasons for 
the decision.13  The pretext and mixed-motive cases also differ in 
the way burdens of proof are allocated.14 
A. Pretext Cases 
In the landmark case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,15 
the United States Supreme Court made it clear that Title VII does 
not require employers to hire individuals because they are 
members of a minority group.16  All that is required of employers 
“is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate 
on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications.”17  In 
order to ensure that employers were not surreptitiously erecting 
discriminatory barriers, the Court in McDonnell Douglas 
established a three-step approach for analyzing pretext cases.18  The 
first step of the tripartite framework places the burden on the 
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.19  Second, 
if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by a preponderance of 
the evidence, the burden then shifts to the employer to establish a 
legitimate business reason for the employment decision.20  Finally, 
if the employer advances a legitimate reason, the burden shifts 
back to the plaintiff, who must prove that the employer’s stated 
 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”). 
 11. Kelly Robert Dahl, Price Waterhouse, Wright Line, and Proving a “Mixed 
Motive” Case Under Title VII, 69 NEB. L. REV. 869, 874–75 (1990). 
 12. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, MAJOR ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL LAW OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 16 (4th ed. 2004). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Sherry Evans, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Balancing Employees’ 
Rights and Employers’ Prerogatives:  Allocation of the Burdens of Proof in a Title 
VII Mixed-Motive Case, 43 SW. L.J. 1149, 1160 (1990). 
 15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 16. Id. at 800. 
 17. Id. at 800–01 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 
(1971)). 
 18. Id. at 802–05. 
 19. Id. at 802. 
 20. Id. 
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reasons for the employment decision were a pretext for 
discrimination.21 
In a subsequent case, Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine,22 the Court discussed the nature of the evidentiary 
burdens that must be satisfied in each step of the pretext 
framework.  The Court characterized the burden of establishing 
the prima facie case as “not onerous.”23  Therefore, the burden that 
shifts to the defendant to rebut the prima facie case is only a 
burden of production, not one of persuasion.24  “The ultimate 
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times 
with the plaintiff.”25  In the third step of the tripartite framework, 
Burdine provided plaintiffs with the option of demonstrating 
pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or 
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence.”26 
B. Mixed-Motive Cases 
The pretext framework assumed that the employment decision 
in question was made for a single reason and that the trier of fact 
must determine what the “true” motivation was—the 
discriminatory factor advanced by the plaintiff or the legitimate 
reason suggested by the employer.27  As courts decided more 
employment discrimination cases, it became clear that it was not 
always easy to pinpoint a single cause for an employment decision.  
Sometimes there was evidence that both legitimate and illegitimate 
reasons played a role, and these situations became known as 
mixed-motive cases.28 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,29 the United States Supreme 
Court, in a plurality opinion, concluded that a different allocation 
of burdens should apply in mixed-motive cases that arise under 
 
 21. Id. at 804. 
 22. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
 23. Id. at 253. 
 24. Id. at 254–55. 
 25. Id. at 253. 
 26. Id. at 256. 
 27. See Kerry S. Acocella, Note, Out with the Old and In with the New:  The 
Second Circuit Shows it’s Time for the Supreme Court to Finally Overrule 
McDonnell Douglas, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 125, 129 (2004). 
 28. Id. 
 29. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
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Title VII.30  In clarifying the evidentiary burdens shouldered by 
each party, the Court distinguished Burdine, stating that “the 
premise of Burdine is that either a legitimate or an illegitimate set 
of considerations led to the challenged decision . . . Burdine’s 
evidentiary scheme will not help us decide a case admittedly 
involving both kinds of considerations.”31  Like in the pretext cases, 
“the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on the issue of 
whether [an unlawful factor] played a part in the employment 
decision.”32  After the plaintiff has proven that an illegitimate 
motive played a role in the employment decision, an employer can 
only avoid liability by demonstrating by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have reached the same decision based on the 
legitimate motive.33  The plurality did not see this as a shifting of 
burdens; rather, it characterized the employer’s burden as “an 
affirmative defense.”34 
The employer’s burden in mixed-motives cases is thus more 
rigorous than in pretext cases.  In pretext cases, the employer bears 
only the burden of production, and that burden is satisfied once the 
employer produces evidence of a legitimate reason for the 
employment decision.35  In mixed-motives cases, the employer 
“must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have 
induced it to make the same decision,”36 and it must do so by a 
preponderance of the evidence.37  It is insufficient for an employer 
to show that it was motivated in part by legitimate factors or that 
the decision could be justified by a legitimate reason.38  Mixed-
motive cases thus put an emphasis on causation, because the 
present tense language of § 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 
 
 30. Id. at 250 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he plaintiff who shows that an 
impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision 
has thereby placed upon the defendant the burden to show that he would have 
made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive.”). 
 31. Id. at 247 (plurality opinion). 
 32. Id. at 246  (plurality opinion). 
 33. Id. at 244–45 (plurality opinion).  After the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was 
passed, however, employers could no longer avoid liability through the same 
decision defense.  The 1991 Act moved the defendant’s burden to the remedy 
phase of litigation, and thus the same decision defense could only be used to limit 
damages.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000). 
 34. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246 (plurality opinion). 
 35. See supra Part II.A. 
 36. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252 (plurality opinion). 
 37. Id. at 253 (plurality opinion). 
 38. Id. at 252 (plurality opinion) (“An employer may not, in other words, 
prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for 
its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision.”). 
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1964 dictates that the inquiry focus on the employer’s motives at 
the actual moment the decision was made.39 
The concurring opinions authored by Justice White and 
Justice O’Connor agreed with the allocation of burdens of 
persuasion, but disagreed when it came to what evidence would be 
sufficient to satisfy those burdens.  The plurality opinion required 
plaintiffs to demonstrate only that a discriminatory criterion played 
a “motivating part” in the decision.40  Justices White and 
O’Connor, in contrast, would have required the plaintiff to show 
that the discriminatory criterion was a “substantial factor” in the 
employment decision.41  Furthermore, the plurality only briefly 
discussed the type of evidence that would be sufficient to establish 
a plaintiff’s case.  While stating that stereotyped remarks could be 
evidence of an impermissible motive, “stray remarks,” standing 
alone, are not sufficient.42  O’Connor’s concurrence tackled the 
issue of the plaintiff’s evidentiary standard head-on, stating that a 
“plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor 
was a substantial factor in the decision.”43  Elaborating on the 
direct evidence requirement, O’Connor’s concurrence suggested 
that the real difference between pretext and mixed-motives cases 
lies not in the number of motivating factors but in the type of 
evidence presented.44  O’Connor envisioned that the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine and the Price Waterhouse frameworks would 
exist side-by-side; she suggested that after all the evidence had 
been presented, the court could determine which framework to 
apply.45 
Although the plurality downplayed the importance of the 
direct evidence requirement,46 Justice Kennedy’s dissent clearly 
 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire . . . .” (emphasis added)).  See 
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–41 (plurality opinion) (“The critical inquiry, the 
one commanded by the words of § 703(a)(1), is whether gender was a factor in the 
employment decision at the moment it was made”); see also Dahl, supra note 11, at 
881–82 (discussing the plurality’s focus on causation). 
 40. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion). 
 41. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. at 251 (plurality opinion). 
 43. Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 250 n.13 (plurality opinion) (“After comparing this description of the 
plaintiff’s proof to that offered by Justice O’Connor’s opinion concurring in the 
judgment . . . we do not understand why the concurrence suggests they are 
meaningfully different from each other.”). 
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viewed O’Connor’s opinion as the rule of Price Waterhouse.47  The 
direct evidence requirement became the subject of much 
commentary,48 and many lower courts followed O’Connor’s direct 
evidence requirement, viewing it as the narrowest grounds for the 
decision.49 
The increased reliance on the direct evidence requirement, 
however, was problematic, because O’Connor did not define direct 
evidence.  Instead, O’Connor only provided examples of what is 
not direct evidence, siding with the plurality in stating that “stray 
remarks in the workplace” would not satisfy the plaintiff’s burden.50  
Additionally, “statements by nondecision-makers or statements by 
decision-makers unrelated to the decisional process itself” would 
not be considered direct evidence.51  The lack of a definition for 
direct evidence caused confusion among the lower courts over 
when to apply Price Waterhouse.52  The dissent foresaw this 
problem, predicting that “[c]ourts [would] also be required to make 
the often subtle and difficult distinction between ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ or ‘circumstantial’ evidence.”53  Another concern with the 
reliance on direct evidence is that it is often hard to come by, 
because following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 employers have 
become increasingly covert about their discriminatory motives.54 
 
 47. Id. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 48. See, e.g., Steven M. Tindall, Note, Do As She Does, Not As She Says:  The 
Shortcomings of Justice O’Connor’s Direct Evidence Requirement in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332 (1996); Joseph J. 
Ward, Note, A Call for Price Waterhouse II: The Legacy of Justice O’Connor’s 
Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination 
Claims, 61 ALB. L. REV. 627 (1997); Michael Zubrensky, Despite the Smoke, There 
is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law 
After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REV. 959 (1994); Dahl, supra note 
11. 
 49. See Michael Abbott, Note, A Swing and a Miss: The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Attempt to Resolve the Confusion over the Proper Evidentiary Burden for 
Employment Discrimination Litigation in Costa v. Desert Palace, 30 J. CORP. L. 
573, 578 (2005); Acocella, supra note 27, at 130. 
 50. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See infra Part II.D. 
 53. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 54. Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas 
Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under 
Title VII, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 985 (1999). 
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C. Civil Rights Act of 1991 
The Civil Rights Act of 199155 superceded much of the Price 
Waterhouse decision shortly after it was decided.56  It is still 
important to understand Price Waterhouse, not only because 
Congress codified much of the Court’s decision, but also because 
the 1991 Act still left many questions unanswered.57  The Act 
codified Price Waterhouse’s allocation of the burdens of production 
and persuasion in mixed-motive cases.58  The 1991 Act resolved one 
point of contention between the Justices: “[A]n unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other 
factors also motivated the practice.”59 
One major question that the 1991 Act left unanswered, 
however, was whether direct evidence is required to apply the 
mixed-motive framework.  The Act itself makes no mention of the 
type of evidence required,60 and the legislative history sheds little 
light on the matter.61  Some have interpreted the absence of a 
reference to direct evidence to mean that “a plaintiff may rely on 
direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent under the 
 
 55. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 56. Landgraf v. Usi Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994) (“[Section] 107 
responds to Price Waterhouse . . . by setting forth standards applicable in “mixed 
motive” cases.”). 
 57. See Acocella, supra note 27, at 131–33 (“[T]he 1991 Act did little to 
elucidate whether direct evidence was required in order for a plaintiff to obtain a 
mixed-motive jury instruction.”); Green, supra note 54, at 993–96 (“[D]iffering 
interpretations of the 1991 Act’s effect on individual disparate treatment 
jurisprudence illustrate the need for clarification about the appropriate framework 
and its relationship to the methods of proof.”). 
 58. The complaining party has the initial burden of “demonstrating” that an 
illegitimate factor motivated the employment decision.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) 
(2000).  The burden then shifts to the respondent to “demonstrate” that he or she 
would have made the same decision in the absence of the illegitimate factor.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). “The term ‘demonstrates’ means meets the burdens of 
production and persuasion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 59. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 60. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 61. Acocella, supra note 27, at 131–32 (“The history surrounding the 1991 Act 
is inconclusive as to whether Congress agreed or disagreed with the direct 
evidence requirement set forth in Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse opinion.  
The concept of direct evidence appears only once in the record of Senate hearings 
on this matter, in comments made by a Georgetown University law professor.”). 
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Act.”62  Others believe that since Congress chose to codify much of 
Price Waterhouse, it implicitly intended to codify the direct 
evidence requirement as well.63 
D. Problems Decoding the Direct Evidence Requirement 
Justice Kennedy’s assertion that courts would struggle with 
drawing the line between direct and indirect evidence turned out to 
be prophetic.64  Federal circuit courts have split over what type of 
evidence is required under the mixed-motive framework,65 and 
some courts—including the Alaska Supreme Court—have flip-
flopped over whether direct evidence is necessary.66 
Following Price Waterhouse, three basic approaches emerged 
with respect to the type of evidence required.  Some circuits67  
and many state courts68 initially adopted a requirement for  
direct evidence; some of these courts, however, adopted a non-
literal definition of “direct evidence.”69  Other courts required  
what became known as “circumstantial-plus” evidence.70 In 
 
 62. Ward, supra note 48, at 646–47. 
 63. Acocella, supra note 27, at 132. 
 64. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 65. See  Zubrensky, supra note 48,  at 970–80 (discussing the varying standards 
that emerged shortly after Price Waterhouse). 
 66. See infra Part III. 
 67. As of 1994, “[h]alf of the nation’s circuit courts—the First, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh—impose[d] a direct evidence requirement on 
mixed-motive plaintiffs.”  Zubrensky, supra note 48, at 973.  Many circuits later 
relaxed their standards, but there was considerable flip-flopping among the courts 
in the 1990s.  See Ward, supra note 48, at 650–57.  By 1997, the Second, Third, 
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits had moved to a more 
relaxed standard, akin to the circumstantial-plus requirement.  Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Levy v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 646 A.2d 
893, 896 n.6 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (“Our Supreme Court, in applying the Price 
Waterhouse analysis, has adopted the term ‘direct evidence theory.’  Accordingly, 
we use the term ‘direct evidence theory’ in the present case, in place of the term 
‘mixed motives’ theory.”); Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 759 
N.E.2d 37, 47–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (requiring plaintiff-employees to present 
direct evidence in order to proceed under the mixed-motive framework); Appeal 
of Montplaisir, 787 A.2d 178, 181–82 (N.H. 2001) (using federal standards to 
evaluate a retaliation claim under state law and noting that the mixed-motive 
framework applies only when there is direct evidence of retaliation). 
 69. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 204 (5th ed. 2000) (discussing circuits that expanded their 
definition of direct evidence). 
 70. See Zubrensky, supra note 48, at 976–78. 
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circumstantial-plus circuits, the courts required either direct 
evidence or “circumstantial evidence that is ‘tied directly to the 
alleged discriminatory animus.’”71  The evidence must “directly 
reflect” a discriminatory motive.72  Like O’Connor in Price 
Waterhouse, the circumstantial-plus courts have largely defined the 
evidence requirement by stating what would not satisfy it, so there 
is still much uncertainty.73 
The final approach courts adopted with respect to evidentiary 
requirements in mixed-motive cases was to allow any evidence that 
would persuade a jury—be it direct, indirect, circumstantial, or 
circumstantial-plus.74  Rhode Island is unique in that it responded 
legislatively to the question of what evidentiary standard is 
required in mixed-motives cases.75  Rhode Island decided to allow 
all types of evidence, stating that “[n]othing contained in this 
section shall be construed as requiring direct evidence of unlawful 
intent or as limiting the methods of proof of unlawful employment 
practices.”76 
E. The Death of the Direct Evidence Requirement 
In the decade following Price Waterhouse, courts all over the 
country became hopelessly entangled in the quagmire of the direct 
evidence requirement, struggling with both its definition and 
whether it was actually required for the mixed-motive framework.77  
 
 71. Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation, 115 F.3d 116, 122 
(2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d 
Cir. 1992)).  But see Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1185 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“When a case is submitted to a jury, and the jury then concludes that a 
preponderance of all of the evidence (of whatever kind) shows that age was a 
motivating factor in the employer’s decision, that is enough for the jury to shift its 
glance to the employer and require it to prove its affirmative defense that the 
decision would have been the same regardless of [an impermissible factor].”).  
This is an example of how some circuits changed their evidentiary standards over 
time. 
 72. Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 73. Fields, 115 F.3d at 122 (“[W]e have cautioned that purely statistical 
evidence would not warrant such a charge; nor would evidence merely of the 
plaintiff’s qualification for and the availability of a given position; nor would 
‘stray’ remarks in the workplace by persons who are not involved in the pertinent 
decision-making process.”); see also Hook, 115 F.3d at 373–75. 
 74. See Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1183–85.  However, the Second Circuit has since 
adopted a circumstantial-plus standard.  See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying 
text. 
 75. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7.3 (2006). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See supra Part II.D. 
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In 2003, the United States Supreme Court finally addressed the 
issue when it decided Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.78  The Court 
unanimously held that a plaintiff need not present direct evidence 
of discrimination in order to fall within the mixed-motive 
framework under Title VII.79  Justice O’Connor filed a brief 
concurrence, explicitly conceding that direct evidence is no longer 
required.80  This united decision was surprising, given how the 
Court splintered in Price Waterhouse.  The change can be 
explained by a single factor—the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.81 
The Court began its analysis with an examination of the 
language of the 1991 Act and its legislative intent.82  The Court 
explained that the statute makes no mention of a direct evidence 
requirement.83  Instead, the 1991 Act requires the plaintiff to 
“demonstrate” that an employer relied on illegitimate factors,84 and 
“demonstrate” is defined only as “meet[ing] the burdens of 
production and persuasion.”85  The Court found that this definition 
“[left] little doubt that no special evidentiary showing is 
required.”86  Reasoning that if Congress had intended to require 
direct evidence it would have made that intent explicit, the Court 
found that “[i]ts failure to do so is significant, for Congress has 
been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof requirements in 
other circumstances.”87 
The silence of the statute and legislative history with respect to 
the type of evidence required caused the Court to rely on 
conventional rules of civil litigation, and these rules allow plaintiffs 
to use direct or circumstantial evidence to prove their case.88  “The 
reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both 
clear and deep-rooted: ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only 
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive 
 
 78. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 79. Id. at 92. 
 80. Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 81. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 82. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98. 
 83. Id. at 98–99. 
 84. Id. at 99. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 98–100. 
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than direct evidence.’”89  The decision contains no “circumstantial-
plus” language; it imposes no requirement that the circumstantial 
evidence be directly linked to a discriminatory attitude, and states 
only that “no heightened showing is required under § 2000e-
2(m).”90  Thus, a plaintiff is entitled to make use of the plaintiff-
friendly mixed-motive framework if he or she presents 
circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory factor in a Title VII 
case.91 
Although the Court in Desert Palace may have attempted to 
relieve the confusion that plagued the lower courts, the picture is 
still far from clear.  Many commentators felt that Desert Palace 
sounded the death knell for McDonnell Douglas and Price 
Waterhouse.92  Following Price Waterhouse, many courts had 
followed Justice O’Connor’s logic that the difference between 
pretext and mixed-motive cases lied not in the number of 
motivating factors but in the type of evidence presented.93  Prior to 
Desert Palace, if a plaintiff provided direct evidence (or 
circumstantial-plus evidence in many circuits)94 the case proceeded 
under the mixed-motive framework.  If a plaintiff failed to produce 
sufficiently strong evidence, the case still proceeded, but under the 
more defendant-favorable McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
framework.  Thus, when Desert Palace eliminated the direct 
evidence requirement, many saw this as also eliminating the 
distinction between pretext and mixed-motive cases.95  Assuming 
that most plaintiffs will proceed under the mixed-motive 
framework, there is little work left to be done by McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine.96 
Despite all the commentary casting doubt on the usefulness of 
McDonnell Douglas, the United States Supreme Court continues 
to utilize it in non-Title VII contexts, such as in cases brought 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)97 and the Age 
 
 89. Id. at 100 (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 
n.17 (1957)). 
 90. Id. at 101. 
 91. Id. 100–01. 
 92. See, e.g., Acocella, supra note 27, at 140. 
 93. Abbott, supra note 49, at 578. 
 94. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
 95. Abbott, supra note 49, at 586 (“Kelly Pierce posits that the elimination of 
the direct evidence requirement will result in a merger of single and mixed motive 
cases.”). 
 96. See Zimmer, supra note 69, at 194. 
 97. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51–53 (2003). 
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Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).98  Desert 
Palace has also been read narrowly by some courts as a holding 
“specifically directed to statutorily-based, post-trial jury instructions 
in a Title VII mixed-motive case.”99  “[A] plain reading of Desert 
Palace indicates a very narrow and focused holding, not a broad, 
sweeping one with instructions that its holding should be applied 
generally to all employment cases.”100  Additionally, some states 
have even refused to follow Desert Palace on state law grounds.101 
Those states and circuits that required direct evidence were 
naturally expected to feel the most substantial impact from the 
Court’s decision in Desert Palace.102  If the abolition of the direct 
evidence requirement was to result in an increase in frivolous 
litigation as some predicted,103 the courts in direct evidence 
jurisdictions would experience the greatest surge.  It is unlikely that 
those states and circuits that had already moved to circumstantial 
or circumstantial-plus evidence would experience the same 
increase, because mixed-motive cases were already being heard in 
the absence of direct evidence.  Although Desert Palace made it 
clear that direct evidence was not required, it did not address the 
“circumstantial-plus” standard required by many circuits.  The 
language of the decision, however, suggests that the circumstantial-
plus standard imposes a higher evidentiary burden than is required 
by Title VII.  The Court stated that “no heightened showing is 
required under § 2000e-2(m).”104  In contrast, the circumstantial-
plus jurisdictions required the evidence to be “tied directly to the 
 
 98. Helfrich v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., No. 03-cv-05793, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14792, at *17–*18 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2005). 
 99. Id. at *2 n.1. 
 100. Id. at *20. 
 101. See Millner v. DTE Energy Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 950, 967 n.18 (E.D. Mich. 
2003) (“Michigan courts continue to require that mixed motive cases under the 
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act be established by direct evidence.”); Rubel v. 
Century Bancshares, Inc., No. 02-482(MJD/JGL), 2004 WL 114942, at *8 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 8, 2004) (“The Desert Palace decision has not been adopted by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, and does not alter the analysis under the [Minnesota 
Human Rights Act].”). 
 102. See Brian M. Peterson, Mixed-Motive Cases After Desert Palace Inc. v. 
Costa, LAWMEMO, http://www.lawmemo.com/articles/costa.htm (last visited Oct. 
29, 2007). 
 103. Abbott, supra note 49, at 585 (“[T]he abolition of the direct evidence 
requirement will ‘shift the balance of Title VII litigation’ and burden employers 
with frivolous litigation.”). 
 104. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). 
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alleged discriminatory animus.”105  How and if these circuits will 
reformulate their evidentiary standards is still unclear. 
III.  ALASKA’S MIXED-MOTIVE CASE LAW 
Alaska mixed-motive cases arise in a number of different 
contexts:  the Alaska Human Rights Act (AHRA),106 Title VII,107 
and common law retaliation actions.108  Due to the differences in 
the causes of action under which mixed-motive cases arise in 
Alaska state courts, it may not be surprising that the Alaska 
Supreme Court has not established a single consistent evidentiary 
standard for mixed-motive cases.  At times, the court has required 
plaintiffs to offer direct evidence to establish a mixed-motive cause 
of action.109  In other instances, the court has required 
circumstantial-plus evidence.110  In still other cases, the court has 
fashioned its own requirement.111 
What is surprising, however, is that the inconsistent 
evidentiary standards cannot be explained solely by the fact that 
the mixed-motive cases arise under different laws.  The supreme 
court has not held that one evidentiary standard applies to Title 
VII cases, another applies to AHRA cases, and yet another applies 
to common law torts.  To the contrary, the court has applied 
varying evidentiary standards even though it has tended to treat all 
mixed-motive employment discrimination claims as one body of 
law.  For example, it has cited to and followed logic from AHRA 
cases in common law retaliation cases112 and relied on federal Title 
VII law in deciding a mixed-motive suit brought under state law.113 
This Part examines the chronological development of mixed-
motive case law in the Alaska Supreme Court, points out the 
court’s tendency to treat the mixed-motive case law as one body of 
 
 105. Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation, No. 96-7523, 1997 
U.S. App. LEXIS 19794, at *28 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. 
Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 106. See Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40 (Alaska 2001); VECO, Inc. 
v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, (Alaska 1999). 
 107. See Sengupta v. Univ. of Alaska, 21 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2001). 
 108. See Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc., 127 P.3d 807 (Alaska 
2005); Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, 93 P.3d 427 (Alaska 2004). 
 109. E.g., Era Aviation, 17 P.3d at 43–44. 
 110. E.g., Sengupta, 21 P.3d at 1258. 
 111. Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc., 133 P.3d 655, 662 (Alaska 2006) (requiring 
“either direct evidence of prohibited motivation or circumstantial evidence strong 
enough to be functionally equivalent to direct proof”). 
 112. See Reust, 127 P.3d 807; see also Kinzel, 93 P.3d 427. 
 113. See Sengupta, 21 P.3d 1240. 
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law, and highlights the court’s vacillation between a direct evidence 
and circumstantial-plus standard within that body of law.  The 
conclusion that follows from this summary is that Alaska should 
adopt an internally consistent standard in order to promote 
consistent outcomes in mixed-motive cases.  The next Part suggests 
that the appropriate standard for Alaska to adopt is the rationale 
of Desert Palace. 
A. In Support of Direct Evidence:  VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock and 
Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors 
The Alaska Supreme Court decided a handful of mixed-
motive cases prior to the Desert Palace decision,114 although all 
these cases were decided after the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991.115  Two of the three pre-Desert Palace cases clearly 
required direct evidence in order to make use of the mixed-motive 
framework.116  This is perhaps unremarkable given the fact that 
many state courts initially adopted a direct evidence requirement.117  
However, before the Alaska Supreme Court decided its first 
mixed-motive case, the Ninth Circuit had already moved to a more 
relaxed standard, akin to the circumstantial-plus requirement.118  
Nevertheless, the Alaska Supreme Court opted to require direct 
evidence in VECO and Era Aviation, the first two mixed-motive 
cases that the court heard. 
In 1991, Rosebrock was laid off from her job at VECO after 
approximately seven months of employment.119  Rosebrock claimed 
 
 114. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 115. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 116. See Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40 (Alaska 2001); see also 
VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999). 
 117. See, e.g., Levy v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 646 A.2d 
893, 896 n.6 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (“Our Supreme Court, in applying the Price 
Waterhouse analysis, has adopted the term ‘direct evidence theory.’  Accordingly, 
we use the term ‘direct evidence theory’ in the present case, in place of the term 
‘mixed motives’ theory.”); Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 759 
N.E.2d 37, 47–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (requiring plaintiff-employees to present 
direct evidence in order to proceed under the mixed motive framework); Appeal 
of Montplaisir, 787 A.2d 178, 181–82 (N.H. 2001) (using federal standards to 
evaluate a retaliation claim under state law and noting that the mixed motive 
framework applies only when there is direct evidence of retaliation). 
 118. See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 
1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 
Stat. 1074, as recognized in Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 
1027, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005); Ward, supra note 48, at 656. 
 119. VECO, 970 P.2d at 908. 
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that during the course of her employment, she was sexually 
harassed and was sexually assaulted by one of her coworkers.120  
She also claimed that she was wrongfully terminated after 
reporting the assault to her supervisor.121  A jury agreed that 
Rosebrock had been wrongfully terminated, and VECO 
appealed.122 
One of the issues raised on appeal was whether the superior 
court had properly instructed the jury on mixed-motives in a 
wrongful termination case.123  Wrongful termination cases are 
brought under a section of the AHRA which makes it “unlawful 
for . . . an employer . . . to discharge, expel, or otherwise 
discriminate against a person because the person has opposed any 
practices forbidden under AS 18.80.200–18.80.280 or because the 
person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in a proceeding 
under this chapter.”124 
VECO claimed the mixed-motives framework did not apply to 
cases brought under this section of the AHRA, but the supreme 
court rejected that contention.125  Relying on the logic of Price 
Waterhouse, the Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that the term 
“because of” in Alaska’s wrongful termination statute did not 
mean “solely because of.”126  Thus, the court held that a wrongful 
termination claim could be based on mixed-motives because 
“[r]equiring plaintiffs . . . to prove that their termination was 
caused solely by their protected actions would unnecessarily 
restrict the term ‘because,’ and would hinder achieving the purpose 
of . . . eradicating discrimination.”127 
The court also relied on Price Waterhouse in holding that 
Rosebrock did not need to choose between a pretext and a mixed-
motive claim.128  In allowing Rosebrock to pursue both theories, the 
Alaska Supreme Court made it clear that the framework that 
would ultimately be applied depended on the type of evidence 
offered by the plaintiff.  “If the jury finds there is direct 
evidence . . . it will apply the mixed-motive framework.  However, 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 909. 
 123. Id. at 920–21. 
 124. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(4) (2006); see also VECO, 970 P.2d at 920. 
 125. VECO, 970 P.2d at 920. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 920–21. 
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if the jury does not find direct evidence, the plaintiff can still 
prevail by using the pretextual framework.”129 
The next year, in Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors,130 the Alaska 
Supreme Court reiterated the direct evidence requirement.  
Lindfors claimed, and the jury agreed, that she had been 
discriminated against because she was a female and that Era 
Aviation had passed her over for sixteen promotions or upgrades 
because of her sex.131  As in VECO, Lindfors’ claim was brought 
under a provision of the AHRA; here, the relevant provision 
makes it “unlawful for . . . an employer to refuse employment to a 
person, or to bar a person from employment, or to discriminate 
against a person in compensation or in a term, condition, or 
privilege of employment because of the person’s . . . sex . . . .”132 
Era Aviation appealed, claiming that the superior court had 
erred when it gave a jury instruction that stated, “Ms. Lindfors 
must prove that it is more likely than not true . . . [t]hat ERA 
intentionally relied upon her sex as a factor in [the employment 
decision] . . . [and] Ms. Lindfors may prove her claim . . . by direct 
or indirect evidence.”133  Although the supreme court ultimately 
found that the error in instructing the jury was harmless,134 the 
court discussed the evidentiary requirements for pretext and 
mixed-motive cases.  Relying on VECO and Price Waterhouse, the 
court stated that “[u]nder the mixed-motive framework, once the 
plaintiff has cleared the initial hurdle of presenting direct evidence 
of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof is 
somewhat relaxed . . . .”135  After clearing this hurdle, the burden 
shifts to the employer to show that it would have made the same 
decision.136  “[I]f the jury finds no direct evidence of discrimination, 
it must find the defendant liable, if at all, under a pretext 
framework.”137  The disputed jury instructions shed some light on 
what Alaska courts considered to be direct evidence: “Direct 
evidence would include oral or written statements showing a 
discriminatory motive for ERA’s [employment decision].  Indirect 
evidence would include proof of a set of circumstances that would 
 
 129. Id. at 921. 
 130. 17 P.3d 40 (Alaska 2000). 
 131. Id. at 42–43. 
 132. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 133. Era Aviation, 17 P.3d at 43 n.5. 
 134. Id. at 43–45. 
 135. Id. at 44. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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allow one to reasonably believe that sex was a motive in ERA’s 
[decision].”138 
Following VECO and Era Aviation, the mixed-motive and 
pretext frameworks existed side-by-side in Alaska, much as Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse had envisioned.139  
Although the court relied on the Price Waterhouse decision in both 
cases, it failed to acknowledge the confusion that had arisen in the 
wake of that case.140  Therefore, the court blindly accepted what it 
saw as the holding in Price Waterhouse without evaluating what 
evidentiary requirement should properly apply in a mixed motive 
case. 
B. Relaxing the Standard:  Sengupta v. University of Alaska and 
Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc. 
VECO and Era Aviation both involved discrimination claims 
brought under the AHRA, which mirrors Title VII.141  In Sengupta 
v. University of Alaska,142 the Alaska Supreme Court considered a 
Title VII case and came to a different conclusion about the 
appropriate evidentiary standard for mixed-motive cases.  This 
time, rather than requiring direct evidence, the court expressed a 
“circumstantial-plus” standard.143 
Dr. Sengupta, a professor of Indian decent, was employed by 
the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) between 1990 and 
1995.144  During this time, Sengupta brought several grievances 
because he felt his salary should be higher, and he believed he had 
been passed over for two positions.145  At a hearing concerning 
these grievances, the presiding officer “found that Sengupta had 
demeaned, degraded, and abused his colleagues; intentionally 
misrepresented his academic degrees; repeatedly dealt with his 
colleagues and the University in a dishonest manner; testified 
falsely under oath multiple times during the hearing; created and 
introduced false documents; and committed plagiarism . . . .”146  
These findings later became the basis for Sengupta’s termination, 
 
 138. Id. at 43 n.5. 
 139. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 278 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 140. See supra Part II.B. 
 141. See Era Aviation, 17 P.3d at 43.  For further analysis of the relation 
between the AHRA and Title VII, see infra text accompanying notes 205–09. 
 142. 21 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2001). 
 143. See id. at 1258. 
 144. Id. at 1245. 
 145. Id. at 1245–46. 
 146. Id. at 1246. 
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and, in response, Sengupta alleged that he was wrongfully 
terminated.147  He brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981148 and 
Title VII, claiming he had been discriminated against on the basis 
of his “race, national origin, or prior EEOC activity.”149  UAF 
prevailed on a motion for summary judgment, and Sengupta 
appealed.150 
The Alaska Supreme Court recognized the confusion that had 
emerged over the evidentiary requirements in mixed-motive cases 
following Price Waterhouse,151 but the opinion failed to cite to the 
court’s own precedent in VECO and Era Aviation.152  Although 
VECO and Era Aviation were based on Alaska law rather than 
Title VII, they could have been used as analogous support in the 
Sengupta analysis, since in the past the court had purported to 
follow “decisions under Title VII in interpreting Alaska’s anti-
discrimination laws, and [had], in large part, endorsed the federal 
approach to analyzing claims of disparate treatment.”153  In the 
alternative, the court could have distinguished VECO and Era 
Aviation as having been decided under state law instead of Title 
VII, but the opinion simply makes no mention of these two prior 
mixed-motive cases.154 
Instead of relying on its mixed-motive precedent, the court 
turned to previous decisions arising out of the pretext framework.  
The court stated: “We have permitted the use of circumstantial 
evidence in pretext cases and we now hold that a plaintiff may 
sustain his threshold burden for a mixed-motive claim by 
presenting circumstantial evidence, as long as this evidence is 
directly linked to the alleged discriminatory attitude.”155  This 
analysis (drawing the evidentiary standard for mixed-motive cases 
from pretext cases)156 is also perplexing, given that, in VECO and 
Era Aviation, the court seemed concerned with drawing a 
 
 147. Id. at 1246–47. 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
 149. Sengupta, 21 P.3d at 1257. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1257–58. 
 152. Id. at 1240. 
 153. Era Aviation v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40, 43 (Alaska 2002). 
 154. See Sengupta, 21 P.3d 1240. 
 155. Id. at 1258.  Interestingly, the pretext case the court cites to support this 
proposition was a case brought under Alaska’s Civil Rights statute, not Title VII.  
This suggests that the court could have relied on VECO and Era Aviation in its 
analysis in this case. 
 156. See supra Part II.A. 
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distinction between the mixed-motive and pretext cases.157  A slight 
distinction remained:  the pretext cases permitted the use of 
circumstantial evidence, while the mixed-motive framework 
required circumstantial-plus evidence.158  What constitutes evidence 
“directly linked to the alleged discriminatory attitude” was left 
largely undefined by the court, but “[a] plaintiff cannot meet the 
threshold burden for a prima facie case through circumstantial 
evidence connected to decision makers only through a series of 
inferences based on other inferences.”159  An example of 
permissible circumstantial-plus evidence given by the court is 
“evidence of racial or national origin animus such as derogatory 
remarks about employees from India.”160  This is a much more 
relaxed standard than the direct evidence requirements of VECO 
and Era Aviation. 
In Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling,161 where the claim was in 
common law tort, the court backtracked slightly.  It recognized the 
direct evidence requirement but adopted a broader definition of 
direct evidence.  Interestingly, the court made no reference to its 
earlier decision in Sengupta.  However, the ultimate result is similar 
to that of Sengupta because the court aligned itself with the Second 
Circuit—a “circumstantial-plus” circuit.162 
Kinzel’s job involved digging trenches with a backhoe, but 
worksite conditions were very poor, and Kinzel filed a complaint 
with the Alaska Department of Labor, Division of Occupational 
Safety and Health (OSH).163  Shortly thereafter, Kinzel was 
reassigned to a different job and injured his back.164  Kinzel was 
subsequently terminated, and he filed suit against Discovery 
Drilling claiming that he was wrongfully terminated for filing an 
OSH complaint.165  Discovery Drilling claimed that Kinzel was fired 
 
 157. E.g., Era Aviation, 17 P.3d at 45 (noting the supreme court’s inclination to 
adopt the distinction between mixed-motive and pretext cases utilized by federal 
courts). 
 158. Evidence that is directly linked to the alleged discriminatory attitude has 
been characterized as “circumstantial-plus” evidence.  See Hook v. Ernst & 
Young, 28 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 159. Sengupta, 21 P.3d at 1258 (quoting the superior court). 
 160. Id. (quoting the superior court). 
 161. 93 P.3d 427 (Alaska 2004). 
 162. Id. at 434–35. 
 163. Id. at 430–31. 
 164. Id. at 431. 
 165. Id. 
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because he lied about his back injury.166  The jury found for 
Discovery Drilling, and Kinzel appealed.167 
In analyzing whether the superior court should have given a 
mixed-motive instruction, the supreme court began with the 
language of Era Aviation.168  In contrast to Sengupta, the court 
reverted to its original position that “there must be ‘direct 
evidence’ that the employer’s conduct was motivated, at least in 
part, by a prohibited reason.”169  The court then attempted to 
define “direct evidence.”170  Recognizing the difficulty of obtaining 
strictly direct evidence, the court decided to align itself with the 
Second Circuit, which had adopted a broader definition of direct 
evidence.171  “The Second Circuit takes the position that a plaintiff 
may prove that a forbidden animus was a motivating factor through 
either direct or circumstantial evidence so long as the 
circumstantial evidence is sufficiently strong.”172  An example of the 
type of evidence allowed by the Second Circuit’s approach is 
“evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the 
decision-making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting 
the alleged discriminatory attitude.”173  This type of evidence is 
properly viewed as “circumstantial-plus” evidence, because it 
requires the evidence to be “sufficiently strong” and to be directly 
linked to the discriminatory animus. 
C. Raising the Evidentiary Bar:  Reust v. Alaska Petroleum 
Contractors, Inc. and Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc. 
Taken together, Sengupta and Kinzel suggested that the 
Alaska Supreme Court was moving toward a more relaxed 
evidentiary standard for mixed-motive litigation.  The year after 
Kinzel was decided, however, the court appeared to retreat from 
the broader interpretation of Kinzel and revert to the direct 
evidence requirement.174  The court cited to Kinzel a number of 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 432. 
 168. Id. at 434. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (“The Second Circuit has observed that ‘direct’ should not be 
understood ‘in its sense as an antonym of “circumstantial,” for that type of 
“direct” evidence as to a mental state is usually impossible to obtain.’” (quoting 
Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 1992))). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 435 (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182). 
 174. See Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc., 127 P.3d 807, 815–16 
(Alaska 2005). 
06__SCHWANITZ.DOC 12/17/2007  11:33:26 AM 
2007] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 309 
times throughout its Reust decision,175 yet the term “circumstantial 
evidence” never appeared in the opinion.  In Mahan, the court 
purported to apply Kinzel’s relaxed definition of direct evidence 
while subtly edging the evidentiary requirement back toward a 
stricter standard.176 
Reust testified that he was offered a job with Alaska 
Petroleum Contractors (APC), but before starting he was 
wrongfully terminated “due to his participation in previous 
litigation between APC and another former employee.”177  APC 
argued that Reust was never actually hired, but the jury ultimately 
sided with Reust.178  On appeal, APC challenged the mixed-motive 
instruction given to the jury.179 
The Alaska Supreme Court started its analysis by stating, 
“[u]nder Alaska law, retaliatory discharge claims can follow 
different analytical frameworks depending on the type of evidence 
presented.  When there is no ‘direct evidence’ of retaliation, a 
pretext framework is used.”180  In contrast, when direct evidence is 
presented, the mixed-motive framework is applied.181  The 
definition of direct evidence from Kinzel was relegated to a 
footnote, with specific reference to circumstantial evidence 
conspicuously absent.182  The language included states that direct 
evidence must directly reflect discriminatory attitudes.183  Although 
the opinion implicitly approves of Kinzel, it also cites to the earlier 
cases of VECO and Era Aviation, both of which imposed the 
stricter standard of direct evidence.184  Requiring a plaintiff to clear 
 
 175. Reust was a wrongful discharge tort case, in which the court established 
the public policy rationale of protecting witnesses from retaliation by citing to 
various Alaska statutes, “including the Alaska Occupations Safety and Health 
Act, the Alaska Human Rights Law, and the Alaska Assisted Living Homes Act.”  
Id. at 812–13 (footnotes omitted). 
 176. See Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc., 133 P.3d 655, 662 (Alaska 2006) 
(stating that circumstantial evidence may be used, but it must be “strong enough 
to be functionally equivalent to direct proof”). 
 177. Reust, 127 P.3d at 810. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 815. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 815 n.23.  Absent from the footnote is Kinzel’s summary of the 
Second Circuit’s position (with which Kinzel aligns) stating that “a plaintiff may 
prove . . . forbidden animus . . . through . . . circumstantial evidence so long as the 
circumstantial evidence is sufficiently strong.”  Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, 93 
P.3d 427, 434 (Alaska 2004). 
 183. Reust, 127 P.3d at 815 n.23. 
 184. See supra Part III.A. 
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the initial hurdle of producing direct evidence in order to access the 
mixed-motive framework is largely reminiscent of Era Aviation. 
In Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc.,185 the court was given yet 
another opportunity to resolve the subtle conflicts in the case law.  
Mahan claimed that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation 
for complaining about her supervisor’s sexual advances.186  Arctic 
Catering maintained that Mahan was fired for poor performance.187  
The superior court dismissed Mahan’s claim because Mahan failed 
to establish a prima facie case, and Mahan appealed.188 
In its analysis, the supreme court reiterated that “mixed-
motive cases require the plaintiff to ‘clear the initial hurdle of 
presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent.’”189  The court 
characterized its holding in Kinzel as requiring “either direct 
evidence of prohibited motivation or circumstantial evidence 
strong enough to be functionally equivalent to direct proof.”190  The 
court failed to explain, however, how to distinguish direct evidence 
from circumstantial evidence that is the functional equivalent of 
direct proof.  Indeed, “functional equivalent of direct proof” 
suggests that the two types of proof may actually merge.  Requiring 
the evidence to be “akin to direct proof”191 nudges the evidentiary 
requirement toward a strict definition of direct proof and away 
from the “circumstantial-plus” standard elucidated by the Second 
Circuit (and purportedly adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court in 
Kinzel).  Although Mahan does not claim to depart from Kinzel in 
any way, its language is original and implicitly imparts a stricter 
standard. 
D. Alaska’s Mixed-Motive Case Law Is Internally Inconsistent 
Admittedly, the inconsistencies between the above cases are 
subtle, but they are very real.  The Alaska Supreme Court’s failure 
to reconcile conflicting standards leaves plaintiffs in a precarious 
position, unaware of what type of evidence will allow them to make 
use of the plaintiff-friendly mixed-motive framework.  VECO and 
Era Aviation represent the strictest standard, requiring direct 
evidence.192  These cases have not been overruled and are still cited 
 
 185. 133 P.3d 655 (Alaska 2006). 
 186. Id. at 660. 
 187. Id. at 657, 661. 
 188. Id. at 658. 
 189. Id. at 662 (quoting Era Aviation v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40, 44 (Alaska 2000)). 
 190. Id. (emphasis added). 
 191. Id. at 663. 
 192. See supra Part III.A. 
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to with approval.193  While Sengupta and Kinzel moved toward the 
“circumstantial-plus” standard,194 the court subtly recast the 
requirements of Kinzel in Reust and Mahan, tightening the 
evidentiary requirement again.195  Part IV will argue that the most 
appropriate solution to this ambiguity would be to follow Desert 
Palace and abandon all heightened evidentiary requirements.  
However, if Alaska courts wish to retain and reconcile the above 
cases, they should do so explicitly so that plaintiffs may know what 
is required of them. 
Kinzel took steps towards reconciling the cases but was 
undermined by the subsequent cases of Reust and Mahan.  The 
Alaska Supreme Court could reconcile the existing cases under the 
logic of Kinzel, because Kinzel retains the direct evidence 
requirement of VECO and Era Aviation while loosening the 
standard of what amounts to “direct evidence.”196  How to define 
direct evidence is not entirely clear, and the Alaska Supreme Court 
must decide whether it wants to adopt the looser circumstantial- 
plus standard or require something stronger—something “akin to 
direct proof.”197  Alaska courts would be wise to follow the 
circumstantial-plus standard, given the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Desert Palace.198  However, even this lowered 
evidentiary requirement is higher than that required by the Desert 
Palace decision.199 
Regardless of how Alaska courts decide to reconcile the 
mixed-motive cases, they should clearly state the evidentiary 
requirement and, if necessary, distinguish the existing cases.  The 
mixed-motive case law is problematic, because the court has failed 
to explicitly acknowledge when it has departed from precedent or 
established a new standard.  In each mixed-motive case, the Alaska 
Supreme Court has acted as if it were following a well-worn path 
when it was really expanding the width of the road upon which it 
traveled. 
 
 193. See, e.g., Mahan, 133 P.3d at 662. 
 194. See supra Part III.B. 
 195. See supra Part III.C. 
 196. See Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, 93 P.3d 427, 434–35 (Alaska 2004). 
 197. Mahan, 133 P.3d at 665. 
 198. See generally supra Part II.E. 
 199. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (“[N]o heightened 
showing is required under § 2000e-2(m).”). 
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IV.  ALASKA CASE LAW IN RELATION TO FEDERAL LAW 
The preceding Part suggested that the mixed-motive case law 
in Alaska is internally inconsistent.  While the internal variations of 
Alaska case law are shades of gray, the difference between Alaska 
law and federal case law is black and white:  Desert Palace 
abrogated the direct evidence requirement in mixed-motive 
cases,200 yet the Alaska Supreme Court continues to insist on its 
use.201  Alaska case law thus requires plaintiffs to meet a higher 
evidentiary standard than is required by federal case law.  This Part 
suggests that Alaska should follow the changing federal tide and 
abandon its reliance on the direct evidence requirement. 
A. Alaska’s Mixed-Motive Case Law Was Initially Consistent 
with the Federal Case Law 
In general, Alaska mixed-motive case law has followed federal 
precedent.  Alaska courts initially adopted “the distinction between 
‘pretext’ and ‘mixed-motive’ cases . . . from the federal courts.”202  
The Alaska Supreme Court also aligned itself with federal case law 
in holding that a plaintiff may simultaneously pursue pretext and 
mixed-motive claims.203  Price Waterhouse explicitly stated that 
“[n]othing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case 
must be correctly labeled as either a ‘pretext’ case or a ‘mixed-
motives’ case from the beginning . . . [;] we expect that plaintiffs 
often will allege . . . that their cases are both.”204 
Much of the reason why state law has so closely followed 
federal law in the mixed-motive context is because the statute 
under which many state-law employment discrimination cases are 
brought, the AHRA,205 “mirrors” Title VII.206  The similarity 
between the two statutes is apparent, as they contain nearly 
identical language.  Title VII makes it unlawful “for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
 
 200. Id. at 92. 
 201. See supra Part III.C. 
 202. Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40, 43–45 (Alaska 2000). 
 203. VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 920–21 (Alaska 1999). 
 204. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
 205. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2006). 
 206. Era Aviation, 17 P.3d at 43. 
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origin.”207  The AHRA similarly makes it “unlawful for . . . an 
employer to refuse employment to a person, or to bar a person 
from employment, or to discriminate against a person in 
compensation or in a term, condition, or privilege of employment 
because of the person’s race, religion, color, or national origin.”208  
Given this striking similarity, it is not surprising that Alaska courts 
“look to decisions under Title VII in interpreting Alaska’s anti-
discrimination laws, and have, in large part, endorsed the federal 
approach to analyzing claims of disparate treatment.”209 
Accordingly, Alaska cases decided in the years before Desert 
Palace were basically in step with the generally accepted 
interpretation of the federal case law.  Instead of classifying cases 
as either mixed-motive or pretext based on whether a 
discriminatory factor was a motive or the motive, many courts 
followed Price Waterhouse and looked at the type of evidence 
presented by the plaintiff to determine where to draw the line 
between mixed-motive and pretext cases.210  Initially, at least half of 
the circuits required direct evidence to merit the application of the 
mixed-motive framework.211  In requiring direct evidence, VECO 
and Era Aviation reflected this trend.212  As federal circuit courts 
moved toward a circumstantial-plus standard, 213 the Alaska 
Supreme Court did so as well in Sengupta.214 
 
 207. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 208. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a).  The Alaska Human Rights Act contains 
additional unlawful factors that are not included in Title VII. Many of the factors 
added to the Alaska statute are covered by other federal statutes.  For example, 
the Alaska statute includes age and disabilities in its list of unlawful factors.  Id.  
In the federal framework, these factors are not included in the language of Title 
VII because they are covered by the ADA and ADEA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). 
 209. Era Aviation, 17 P.3d at 43 (citations omitted). 
 210. O’Connor’s concurrence suggested that the real difference between 
pretext and mixed-motive cases was the type of evidence required.  See Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see 
also supra notes 40–44.  O’Connor’s concurrence was adopted as the rule of Price 
Waterhouse by many courts.  Abbott, supra note 49, at 578. 
 211. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A. 
 213. See supra Part II.D. 
 214. Sengupta v. Univ. of Alaska, 21 P.3d 1240, 1258 (Alaska 2001). 
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B. Recent Alaska Case Law Has Failed to Follow the Federal 
Law 
After Desert Palace, Alaska’s mixed-motive case law diverged 
from the federal decisions in Title VII cases.  Kinzel, Reust, and 
Mahan were all decided after Desert Palace, yet none of them even 
mentioned that case.215  Kinzel (decided an entire year after Desert 
Palace) discusses how courts have struggled with the meaning of 
the term “direct evidence” in the wake of Price Waterhouse,216 but 
fails to recognize that the outcome of that struggle was of little 
consequence since direct evidence was no longer required under 
Title VII.  Even though Kinzel broadened the definition of direct 
evidence,217 the court still imposed a higher evidentiary burden than 
was required under the federal case law.218 
A failure to acknowledge the undoing of the direct evidence 
requirement continued in Reust, which called for different 
frameworks to be applied depending on whether the evidence was 
direct or circumstantial.219  Mahan represents the supreme court’s 
most blatant failure to recognize Desert Palace:  “Under federal 
case law, mixed-motive cases require the plaintiff to ‘clear the 
initial hurdle of presenting direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent.’”220  While this statement may still be true in non-Title VII 
cases, it is clearly false in the Title VII context after Desert 
Palace.221  The supreme court in Mahan goes on to reiterate this 
inaccurate assertion, stating, “In Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, we 
declined to strictly apply the federal ‘direct evidence’ 
requirement.”222  Yet the direct evidence requirement in Title VII 
mixed-motive cases had already been abandoned prior to Kinzel.223  
The language of Mahan also covertly ratcheted up the evidentiary 
burden in a mixed-motive case, requiring direct evidence or its 
 
 215. See Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc., 133 P.3d 655 (Alaska 2006); Reust v. 
Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc., 127 P.3d 807 (Alaska 2005); Kinzel v. 
Discovery Drilling, 93 P.3d 427 (Alaska 2004). 
 216. Kinzel, 93 P.3d at 434 (“The term ‘direct evidence’ in the context of the 
mixed-motive methodology comes from the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.  Courts subsequent to Price 
Waterhouse have struggled with the meaning of the term ‘direct.’”). 
 217. Id. at 434–35. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Reust, 127 P.3d at 815. 
 220. Mahan, 133 P.3d at 662 (quoting Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40, 
44 (Alaska 2001)). 
 221. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003). 
 222. Mahan, 133 P.3d at 662. 
 223. See supra note 82–87. 
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functional equivalent.224  Thus, this decision moved Alaska case law 
even further from its federal counterpart. 
C. Alaska Should Recognize the Change Heralded by Desert 
Palace 
It is unclear why the Alaska Supreme Court has failed to 
recognize the change made by Desert Palace.  One potential 
explanation is that the court has not encountered a Title VII case 
post-Desert Palace—Kinzel, Reust, and Mahan were all decided 
under state law, not Title VII.  Because the Desert Palace holding is 
limited to Title VII cases, the Alaska Supreme Court was not 
obligated to follow it in any of the recent mixed-motive decisions.225  
This explanation is unsatisfactory, however, because Alaska’s civil 
rights legislation was modeled after Title VII, and the supreme 
court has expressed its intent to follow Title VII cases in 
interpreting Alaska’s anti-discrimination laws.226  While Alaska 
could choose to decline to follow Desert Palace on state law 
grounds,227 it has not yet decided to do so. 
What is clear is that the Alaska Supreme Court should finally 
recognize Desert Palace and abandon the direct evidence 
requirement in its own mixed-motive jurisprudence.  A number of 
legal and policy reasons justify such a move.  First, the supreme 
court should adopt the Desert Palace standard to ensure that what 
the court says and what it does are consistent.  Indeed, the supreme 
court continues to indicate that it is following the federal mixed-
motive case law.228  But it has patently ignored the most recent, and 
thus most important, federal case on point.  If Alaska intends to 
follow the lead of federal courts, it should acknowledge the impact 
of Desert Palace and abandon its reliance on direct evidence. 
 
 224. See Mahan, 133 P.3d at 663. 
 225. See Millner v. DTE Energy Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 950, 967 n.18 (E.D. Mich. 
2003) (“Michigan courts continue to require that mixed motive cases under the 
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act be established by direct evidence.”); Rubel v. 
Century Bancshares, Inc., No. 02-482(MJD/JGL), 2004 WL 114942, at *8 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 8, 2004) (“The Desert Palace decision has not been adopted by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, and does not alter the analysis under the [Minnesota 
Human Rights Act].”). 
 226. Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40, 43 (Alaska 2000); Millner, 285  
F. Supp. 2d at 967 n.18. 
 227. Cf. Rubel, 2004 WL 114942, at *8; see supra 225 and accompanying text 
(listing other states that have declined to follow Desert Palace on state law 
grounds). 
 228. See Mahan, 133 P.3d at 662. 
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Second, it is contrary to the goals and purposes of the AHRA 
to continue to require that plaintiffs satisfy the more stringent 
direct evidence requirement or its functional equivalent,229 while 
plaintiffs who bring similar mixed-motive claims under Title VII—
upon which the AHRA was modeled—must only present 
circumstantial evidence. 230  Because the mixed-motive framework is 
more favorable to plaintiffs than the pretext framework,231 Title VII 
plaintiffs are more likely to prevail than their state law 
counterparts.  This makes no sense in light of the similarities 
between the two laws.232 
Third, the policy considerations that originally prompted a 
reexamination of the direct evidence requirement counsel against 
retaining the higher evidentiary burden.  As the Price Waterhouse 
fallout makes clear, defining direct evidence is not easy, and the 
existence of numerous possible interpretations has led to divergent 
results in similar cases.233  The circuit split that followed Price 
Waterhouse suggests that the direct evidence requirement was not a 
workable standard, as similarly situated plaintiffs were being 
treated differently in each jurisdiction.  The Seventh Circuit 
acknowledged the potential for confusion, stating that “because 
‘mind reading is not an accepted tool of judicial inquiry’ the only 
true direct evidence of intent that will ever be available is 
‘acknowledgement of discriminatory intent by the defendant or its 
agents.’”234  Although such direct evidence was not required in all 
circuits, the Seventh Circuit’s statements show how stringently the 
requirement can be interpreted.  Additionally, discrimination has 
become more covert as employers try to avoid Title VII liability.235  
Therefore, it is increasingly unlikely that an employer would 
acknowledge discriminatory intent—making “true” direct evidence 
a rarity. 
Fourth, direct evidence—while harder to come by—is not 
necessarily better than circumstantial evidence and is not required 
 
 229. See id. 
 230. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003). 
 231. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.  This is especially true in 
light of the changes made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  See supra Part II.C. 
 232. See Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40, 43 (Alaska 2000). 
 233. See, e.g., Tindall, supra note 48, at 364–65. 
 234. See Elissa R. Hoffman, Note, Smoking Guns, Stray Remarks, and Not 
Much in Between: A Critical Analysis of the Federal Circuits’ Inconsistent 
Application of the Direct Evidence Requirement in Mixed-Motive Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 181, 192 (2002) (quoting 
Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 235. Id. at 188. 
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in other situations.  One Justice made this point very clear at oral 
arguments in Desert Palace, stating: 
[Y]ou would be suggesting a rule that, as far as I know, is alien to 
our law, that is, to make a distinction between direct evidence 
and circumstantial evidence.  You can have direct evidence by a 
liar and you can have highly convincing circumstantial evidence.  
So why would the law in this one area make a distinction that, as 
far as I know, is not made elsewhere?236 
As the Court alluded to, circumstantial evidence is routinely 
relied upon in other contexts, including criminal prosecutions.237  
Courts generally focus on “the probative value of evidence, rather 
than its type . . . because ‘[s]trong circumstantial proof may be 
much more probative than weak direct evidence, as when 
fingerprint evidence places a defendant at the scene of the crime 
while ‘direct’ eyewitness evidence from a . . . near-sighted person 
does not.’”238  This point was reiterated in the Desert Palace opinion 
itself.239  Thus, it is not only a daunting task to draw a workable 
distinction between direct and indirect evidence, but such a 
distinction may have no relationship to the relative strength of the 
evidence. 
Proponents of the direct evidence requirement argue that 
O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence requires direct evidence 
in order to make use of the mixed-motive framework.240  According 
to this argument, the plaintiff-friendly burden-shifting of the 
mixed-motive framework is only justified if plaintiffs present 
sufficiently powerful evidence.241  However, this argument ignores 
the fact that direct evidence is not necessarily more powerful than 
circumstantial evidence.242 
 
 236. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 
(2003) (No. 02-679). 
 237. See id.; Brief for the Respondent at 42, Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90 (No. 02-
679). 
 238. Zubrensky, supra note 48, at 980 (citation omitted). 
 239. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100 (“‘Circumstantial evidence is not only 
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying, and persuasive than direct 
evidence.’”) (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508, n.17 (1957)). 
 240. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14–
17, Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90 (No. 02-679). 
 241. Daniel P. Johnson, Note, Employment Law: Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa: 
Returning to Title VII’s Core Principles by Eliminating the Direct Evidence 
Requirement in Mixed-Motive Cases, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 403, 416 (2004). 
 242. See supra notes 236–239 and accompanying text. 
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Proponents of the direct evidence requirement also argue that 
it survived the amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1991.243  Parts 
of the legislative history indicate that Congress may have intended 
to adopt a direct evidence requirement.244  Prior to Desert Palace, 
this sentiment prevailed, because “all the circuit courts except the 
Ninth Circuit held that the direct evidence requirement survived 
the 1991 Act.”245  However, the Court in Desert Palace concluded 
that direct evidence did not survive the 1991 Act.246 While the 
Court rooted much of its analysis in the language of the statute,247 
the policy behind Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
supports the Court’s decision.  The ultimate purpose of Title VII 
was to combat racism and end discrimination.248  Part of achieving 
this ultimate goal involves promoting “‘voluntary compliance with 
the nondiscriminatory prohibitions.’”249  Allowing employees to 
pursue claims under the plaintiff-friendly mixed-motive framework 
without direct evidence encourages voluntary compliance and 
settlements.250  In the wake of Desert Palace, doomsayers predicted 
that the courts would be flooded with employment discrimination 
claims.251  However, the mere threat of this deluge of litigation 
could also have the more benign effect of encouraging employers 
to take affirmative steps towards eliminating discrimination and 
minimizing the potential for litigation.252 
The elimination of the direct evidence requirement is similarly 
in step with the primary purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  
In passing the 1991 Act, Congress intended to “respond to recent 
Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil rights protections 
that were dramatically limited by those decisions . . . [and] to 
strengthen existing protections and remedies available under 
federal civil rights law to provide more effective deterrence and 
 
 243. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
17–18, Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90 (No. 02-679). 
 244. Johnson, supra note 241, at 420 (“The House Education and Labor 
Committee’s reports reveal that Congress intended the 1991 Act to establish ‘the 
rule applied by the majority of the circuits.’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO 102-40, pt. 
II, at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 711). 
 245. Id. at 423. 
 246. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–101 (2003). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Johnson, supra note 241, at 423. 
 249. Id. at 425 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2378 (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2378). 
 250. Id. at 427–28. 
 251. See supra Part II.E. 
 252. Johnson, supra note 241, at 427–28. 
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adequate compensation for victims of discrimination.”253  
Therefore, even though the 1991 Act was passed in part as a 
reaction to Price Waterhouse, it was more broadly intended to 
protect employee rights.  Restoring and strengthening the existing 
protections depends, in large part, on the ability of plaintiffs to 
make effective use of the protections available to them.  
Ultimately, if plaintiffs are not able to obtain remedies in the court 
simply because they lack direct evidence, the purposes underlying 
the 1991 Act would be frustrated. 
Finally, abandoning the direct evidence requirement would do 
more than simply harmonize Alaska case law with the federal 
mixed-motive cases.  It would resolve the internal confusion 
produced by the existing case law, because the earlier decisions 
requiring strict direct evidence254 would be overruled with the 
adoption of the Desert Palace rationale.  Moreover, Alaska courts 
would no longer have to struggle with the daunting question of how 
to define direct evidence.  If Alaska chooses to retain a higher 
evidentiary requirement, it should fully endorse the less stringent 
circumstantial-plus standard because it represents a lesser 
departure from the federal standard.  This Note has suggested that 
circumstantial-plus evidence still represents a higher standard than 
the one endorsed in Desert Palace.255  Nevertheless, a 
circumstantial-plus standard would at least be closer than direct 
evidence to the evidentiary standard laid down in Desert Palace. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the wake of Price Waterhouse, courts all over the country 
have struggled to determine what a plaintiff must prove in order to 
gain access to the favorable mixed-motive framework.  Alaska 
courts have not been immune to this struggle, and the standards 
advanced have gradually mutated as courts grapple with the issue.  
The evidentiary standard that Alaska courts require has vacillated 
between a stricter direct evidence standard and the looser 
circumstantial-plus requirement.  The courts, however, have turned 
a blind eye to their own flip-flopping.  Perhaps even more 
problematic is the fact that, although the Alaska Supreme Court 
has steadfastly claimed to be following federal case law in 
 
 253. Brief of the Nat’l Employment Lawyers Assoc., as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Respondent, Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (No. 
02-679), 2003 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 438, at **8 (quoting H.R. REP. NO 102-40, 
pt. II, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 549). 
 254. See, e.g., VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999). 
 255. See supra note 102–105 and accompanying text. 
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interpreting Alaska’s anti-discrimination law, it has completely 
ignored the landmark case of Desert Palace.  The Alaska Supreme 
Court has clung to an archaic evidentiary standard despite the 
federal decision to abandon it.  The Alaska Supreme Court has had 
three chances to recognize and adopt Desert Palace, but each time 
the court has, unfortunately, remained silent.  It is time that the 
court addresses this issue head-on and realigns itself with the 
federal case law. 
